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Reforming local government in Pakistan
One year into the term of the new Pakistani government and promises to hold local government elections across
the country have not fully materialised. Polling took place in Baluchistan in December 2013 but local elections
scheduled to take place in Sindh and Punjab appear to have been deferred indefinitely. In this context, Ali
Cheema, Adnan Khan and Roger Myerson analyse local democracy in Pakistan and recommend ways in
which to strengthen the system.
The history of Pakistan shows a paradoxically countercyclical pattern for local democracy. Three times since the
creation of the south Asian nation, elected institutions of local democracy have been created by military regimes,
and each time the subsequent civilian governments have either failed to revive elected local governments or
replaced them with unelected administrators. Thus, although mainstream political parties promised local
democracy in their election manifestos, the future existence of democratic local government in Pakistan is
seriously in doubt.
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Supporters of democracy in Pakistan must understand this countercyclical pattern of local democracy to seek
ways of escaping from it. Successful democracy depends on a vital relationship between democratic politics at
the local and national levels. A commitment by civilian democratic regimes to functional elected local
governments would strengthen the foundations of federal democracy in Pakistan. In a recent paper, Breaking the
Countercyclical Pattern of Local Democracy in Pakistan, we consider how this disconnection between political
parties and local democracy evolved, and how the foundations of democracy in Pakistan could be strengthened
by healing this rift.
Why has local democracy been associated only with military regimes?
Elected local governments have helped military regimes to legitimise and strengthen their control over the state.
To counter the popular support of democratic political parties, military regimes built an alternative base of political
support by patronising a class of new locally elected politicians. Elected local officials could offer the non-
representative central government a vital political connection to local constituencies throughout the nation. Local
officials could communicate local concerns to the centre as they helped the non-representative centre to extend
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its influence in local politics.
In all these local-government reforms, however, political parties have been consistently excluded from any role
in sponsoring candidates for local elections. As a result of this rule, mainstream political parties have seen non-
partisan local governments as an instrument of military regimes for creating a class of collaborative politicians to
displace the parties’ representatives at the local level.
In a democratic regime, it is very difficult to pass a new local-government act when the political parties’
representatives in the national and provincial assemblies see elected officials of nonpartisan local government
as competitors for power and patronage. Party manifestos might promise to reform local democracy, but the
assemblies would find it more convenient to keep discussing plans for local government without implementing
any.
The disconnection from local democracy has weakened national democracy
In a strong democratic system, outstanding achievements in local government should open a path for local
leaders to advance to higher political offices, but such paths are closed when mainstream parties are separated
from local government. When local government is nonpartisan, political parties cannot enhance their reputations
by sponsoring better local governance. Thus, democratic competition to improve local government is weakened,
and barriers to entry are raised in provincial and federal politics.
The structure of political parties has been affected by their disjunction from democratic local government.
Political parties in Pakistan are highly centralised, and their national and provincial leadership retains
considerable control with regard to the nominations of legislative candidates and strategic decision-making.
Well-designed local government reforms can strengthen Pakistan’s federal democracy
A reformed local-government system that strengthens Pakistan’s federal democracy must engage the
mainstream political parties and give them a stake in supporting local democracy. Most importantly, by engaging
the provincial and national parties, local democratic institutions should help the parties to develop a broader
political base of active local supporters, whose energies should strengthen their party at all levels. The strength
of a democratic political party must ultimately depend on the quality of its candidates. Well-designed local
governments should serve as a primary source of candidates who can advance democratically to higher offices
after first proving their ability to earn popular approval at the local level.
We believe local institutions could be designed better to meet these criteria. A vital role for parties in local
elections can be assured by electing local councils according to a list system of proportional representation, in
which voters choose among competing party lists. But if voters only choose among party lists that were formed
by party leaders, then local elections will do nothing to promote the political advancement of individual
candidates who achieve greater popular approval.
To achieve this function, voters’ ballots in local elections should also include some indications of approval or
disapproval for individual candidates. Such votes for individual candidates can be incorporated into a party-list
system of proportional representation by using what is called an “open list.”
Letting local councils at each level elect their own executive mayor or nazim would give effective responsibility
for local government to a broadly representative group of local leaders, which would be consistent with the
systems of parliamentary responsibility that are already constitutionally mandated in government at the
provincial and national levels in Pakistan
Established leaders in the national and provincial governments might naturally have concerns about elected
local officials becoming future competitors for power. Any reform that enhances democratic competition is bound
to raise such concerns. But these concerns should be substantially assuaged when candidates for local
elections are nominated by the parties that have representation in the national and provincial assemblies.
Credible commitment to effective local democracy will require protection for local governments against selective
politically-motivated interference in their domain by higher tiers of government. There is always a risk that
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provincial and national politicians may be tempted to use the power of the higher tiers of government to
undermine local leaders who are seen as potential political rivals. So it may be important to provide some
constitutional protection for local governments or independent judicial review of such actions against them.
Click here for the complete article, “Breaking the Countercyclical Pattern of Local Democracy in Pakistan.”
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